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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

L

Nature o/Case:
The nature of the underlying case concerns the single issue of whether the need of/for right

TKA by Appellant herein, Charles LeRoy Hartgrave (hereafter referenced as "LeRoy") was hastened,
accelerated and/or advanced in time by reason of LeRoy's two industrial left knee injuries, of
February 3, 2009 and/or August 23, 2012, or the combination thereof.

IL

Course ofProceedings and Disposition:
LeRoy suffered industrial injuries to his left knee during the course of his employment with

the City of Twin Falls (hereafter referenced as "City" and/or ''the City") upon February 3, 2009, and
again upon August 23, 2012. Hearing in this matter was originally scheduled for September 23,
2015. However, LeRoy was a "reluctant" Claimant. LeRoy had been an employee with the City in
excess of thirty-eight (3 8) years. He was then sixty-one (61) years of age, and wished to continue
his employment with the City until retirement. LeRoy had become friends with his co-workers and
supervisors, and expressed to his attorney that he was greatly uncomfortable in proceeding through
an adversarial Title 72 proceeding against the City. R., p. 82.
It was by reason of LeRoy's "relationship" with the City that he entered into the Modified
Lump Sum Agreement against the recommendation of his counsel. The Modified Lump Sum
Agreement reserved from that settlement the issue of whether LeRoy's manifestation of right knee
symptomatology and, thusly, need for right TKA was as consequence of his two industrial left knee
injuries, status-post two left knee surgeries.
Following approval of the Modified Lump Sum Agreement, the parties agreed to submit this
reserved issue to the Commission "upon the record," such that LeRoy would not be required to
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 1

testify or be personally involved in an adversarial Title 72 claim against the City. Of note,
consideration paid to LeRoy by the Title 72 Defendants, Respondents herein, pursuant to the
Modified Lump Sum Agreement included consideration for "Disputed Medical Benefits," totaling
$1,927.17, being the amount of LeRoy's out-of-pocket expenses for the disputed right TKA, for his
contractual "co-pays" pursuant to the terms and conditions of his group healthcare provider, Blue
Cross of Idaho.
The issue before the Commission was assigned to Referee Michael E. Powers, who filed his
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation by instrument dated July 25, 2016. R.,
pp. 41-52. Following review of Referee Powers' proposed decision, the Commission agreed with
the result, but concluded "...that a different treatment of the issue of causation is warranted, and
therefore substitutes (its) decision for that proposed by the Referee, and entered its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order, dated and filed August 30, 2016. R., pp. 53-66.
Believing the Commission's decision to be in error, LeRoy's Notice of Appeal was filed by
instrument dated October 5, 2016. Subsequently, upon review of the Agency's Record, it was
discovered by LeRoy's counsel that the same failed to include any of the parties' Joint Exhibits, such
that he filed Claimant's/Appellant's Motions for Suspension of Appeal and Temporary Remand to
the Industrial Commission, following which the Court entered its Order Granting Motions for
Suspension of Appeal and Temporary Remand, dated January 19, 2017. R., pp. 78-79. Following
the parties' Modified Lump Sum Agreement, the Commission inadvertently destroyed the parties'
Joint Exhibits. The Commission's record was then augmented by/with the parties' Joint Exhibits.
On June 23, 2017, the Commission entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order, determining that, "Claimant has failed to prove his right knee TKA is compensable."
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Ill.

Statement of Facts:

1.

Personal Data and Employment History for Claimant/Appellant, Charles

LeRoy Hartgrave:
LeRoy was born upon

and graduated high school in Murtaugh, Idaho,

in 1973. Hartgrave Depo., p. 6, LL. 1-17. LeRoy became employed by the City of Twin Falls,
with/for the Street Department, and has been so employed since April 4, 1978. Hartgrave Depo.,
p. 7, LL. 14-19; and, p. 7, L. 20-p. 8, L. 11.
While in high school, LeRoy tore the meniscus in his right knee playing football, and
underwent meniscectomy in his junior year. From the date of his release from that procedure to his
initial left knee industrial injury of February 3, 2009, LeRoy had not presented to any physician by
reason of his right knee, and was fully able to engage in his work-related activities as well as such
recreational activities as hunting, without restriction. Hartgrave Depo., p. 6, LL. 17-20; p. 30, L.
15-p. 32, L. 18.

2.

Accident and Injury of February 3, 2009:

Upon February 3, 2009, LeRoy suffered his initial left knee injury during the course of his
employment with the City. LeRoy came under the care of orthopedic surgeon R. Tyler McKee.
Following failure of conservative care, LeRoy underwent arthroscopic surgery upon May 6, 2009.
JE. B., pp. 33-34. Following arthroscopic surgery, although LeRoy still complained ofleft knee

symptomatology, he was released to return to work by Dr. McKee. JE., B. pp. 50-52. Upon August
30, 2010, LeRoy presented to orthopedic surgeon Dr. James Retmier, for a second opinion related
to his continuing left knee pain. Dr. Retmier recommended left TKA. JE., C. l, pp. 53-56.
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Upon receipt of Dr. Retinier's request for authorization for left TKA, Defendant-Respondent
State Insurance Fund (hereafter referenced as "Fund,") required LeRoy to undergo IME by Dr. Brian
Tallerico, who is affiliated with O-M-A-C. Within his December 16, 2010, report, Dr. Tallerico
noted that LeRoy was "... a very hard working and straight-forward individual who has no secondary
gain issues"; but, determined that LeRoy's left knee injury was an aggravation of pre-existing plica
and the findings on MRI and the arthroscopy done by Dr. McKee were degenerative in nature. Dr.
Tallerico advised that there was no need for left TKA and, if there was need, that need was not
· related to the February 3, 2009, industrial event. Upon that basis, the Fund denied Dr. Retmier's
request for left TKA. JE. G.l., pp. 271-280. LeRoy then returned to work with/for the City.
3.

Accident and Injury of August 23, 2012:

Upon August 23, 2012, LeRoy suffered another work-related left knee injury during the
course of his employment with the City. Following failure of conservative care, LeRoy again
presented to Dr. McKee and ultimately required surgery upon March 13, 2013. JE. C.3., pp. 111112. Post-surgery, LeRoy complained of constant pain in the left knee. JE. C.3., pp. 143-144.

However, Dr. McKee released LeRoy to return to work effective August 9, 2013, with permanent
restrictions of no squatting or kneeling, and lifting limited to fifty (50) pounds. JE. C.3., p. 145.
4.

Manifestation and Progression of Right Knee Symptomatology Culminating in

Right TKA on November 25, 2013:

Upon November 8, 2013, LeRoy re-presented to Dr. McKee with bilateral knee pain. LeRoy
advised the doctor, "that his right knee is worsening." In fact, he was in constant pain, which was
disabling at times. Dr. McKee noted that LeRoy was limping, favoring both lower extremities and,
following discussion of medical options, LeRoy and the doctor elected to proceed with right TK.A.
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JE. C.3., pp.146-149. LeRoyunderwentrightTK.A by Dr. McKee upon November 25, 2013. JE.,
C.3., pp. 162-164.

Within its June 23, 2017, decision, the Commission noted that, "[t]he sole issue to be decided
is whether Claimant's right total knee arthroplasty {TK.A) is compensable." R., p. 173.

The

Commission also noted that,
[h]ere, the argument is that Claimant's preexisting right knee condition was
aggravated by the industrial accident by this path: Claimant suffered a left knee injury
which required surgery. During his convalescence, Claimant was required to use
crutches and this use of crutches caused a gait alteration which aggravated his right
knee condition. If this causal chain finds support in the medical record, Claimant's
right knee injury would be compensable pursuant to the 'compensable consequences'
doctrine.

R., pp. 185-186. Ultimately, the Commission determined that LeRoy failed to prove his right TK.A
was compensable.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

I.

Did the Idaho State Industrial Commission err in its determination that Claimant's

right TK.A was not compensable, as an indirect result and/or consequence of Claimant's primary
industrial left knee injuries, status-post surgeries?
2.

Whether the Idaho State Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusion of

Law, and Order dated/filed June 23, 2017, was erroneous as a matter or law; supported by substantial
and competent evidence of record; set forth specific findings necessary and required for meaningful
appellate review; and/or, whether relevant thereto, failed to make proper application of law to the
evidence of record, in reaching the same?
3.

Whether, pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-804 and/or Rule 41, IAR, Claimant is entitled

to reasonable attorney fees on appeal herein?
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ARGUMENT
I.

Standard of Appellate Review:
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court will uphold the Commission's Findings of Fact, if

supported by substantial, competent evidence. The "substantial evidence rule" requires a Court to
determine whether the Commission's Findings of Fact are reasonable. In deciding whether the
Findings of Fact are reasonable, the Court should not read only one side of the case and, if any
evidence is therein found, sustain the Commission's action and ignore the record to the contrary.

Kirk v. Karcher Estates, Inc., 135 Idaho 230, 16 P.3d 906 (Idaho 2000); Ewins v. Allied Security,
138 Idaho 343, 63 P.3d 469 (Idaho 2003); Rudolph v. Spudnik Equip., 139 Idaho 776, 86 P.3d 490
(Idaho 2004). Put simply, the substantial evidence rule requires the Court to determine whether the
Findings of Fact are reasonable. Mulder v. Liberty N. W. Ins. Co., 135 Idaho 52, 14 P .3d 372 (Idaho
2000).
The Supreme Court freely reviews the Commission's Conclusions ofLaw. Hamilton ex reL

Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Serv., 135 Idaho 568, 21 P.3d 890 (Idaho 2001). Determining the
meaning of a statute or applying law to undisputed facts constitutes matters of law on appeal. An
Appellate Court may apply the law to undisputed facts, de novo. Martel v. Bulotti, 138 Idaho 451,
65 P.3d 192 (Idaho 2003). The Court is required to set aside the Order of the Commission where
the Commission failed to make a "proper application of law to the evidence." Where the
Commission's Conclusions of Law are unsupported by its Findings of Fact, the decision of the
Commission must be vacated. Bortz v. Payless Drug Store, 110 Idaho 942, 719 P.2d 1202 (Idaho
1986).

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 6

II.

Claimant's Right TKA is Clearly Compensable, Pursuant to the Doctrine of
Compensable Consequences:
As noted by the Commission within its June 23, 2017, decision, when a primary injury

(LeRoy's two left knee injuries) is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of employment,
every natural consequence that flows from that injury (LeRoy' s right TKA) is itself compensable.

R., p. 186. Two physicians stated their respective opinions of record in this matter, being Dr. Brian
Tallerico, Defendants' IME expert; and, Dr. R. Tyler McKee, LeRoy' s orthopedic surgeon following
the initial industrial left knee injury of February 3, 2009, through current.
Dr. McKee examined LeRoy upon thirty (30) occasions; performed surgery upon LeRoy' s
left knee upon May 6, 2009 and March 30, 2013; and, performed right TKA upon November 26,
2013. JE. B., pp. 20-52; and, JE. C.3., pp. 87-191.
Conversely, as Respondents' IME physician, Dr. Tallerico never treated LeRoy. Rather, Dr.
Tallerico examined LeRoy upon IME basis upon December 16, 2010, relative to left knee
presentment; August 6, 2011, relative to the left knee and hip; November 21, 2013, relative to the
left knee; and, April 17, 2014, relative to the left knee. Thusly, Dr. Tallerico examined LeRoy upon
but four (4) occasions, with none of these examinations being specific to LeRoy's right knee. JE.
G.1-7, pp. 271-327; and, Tallerico Depo., p. 25, LL. 8-14

During Dr. Tallerico's post-hearing deposition he was asked whether, in conjunction with
his IME examinations of LeRoy's left lmee, he examined LeRoy's right knee. Dr. Tallerico
responded that, "I probably did at least a cursory exam of the right knee...." Tallerico Depo., p. 12,
LL. 19-23. These "cursory" examinations would, "not (be) as thorough as the accepted body part
for the claim.... " Tallerico Depo., p. 28, LL. 1-9. Dr. Tallerico' s opinions upon LeRoy' s right knee
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presentment, inclusive of issues of causation, were not upon personal examination specific to right
knee presentment or upon records review which encompassed actual diagnostic film of LeRoy' s
right knee, subsequent to Dr. Tallerico's initial examination of LeRoy upon December 16, 2010.

Tallerico Depo., p. 27, LL. 2-23.
It is within the context of this "background," that the doctors' opinions must be considered.
In this regard, it is within this same vein that the rationale of the Commission in adopting and
emphasizing certain of the opinions ofDr. Tallerico as expressed within the June 23, 2017, decision
must be considered within the context of the instant appeal.
Discussion of the Commission's June 23, 2017, decision is as follows:
1.

Finding of Fact 12, R., p. 177: The Commission noted Dr. Tallerico's initial IME

report, at JE. G. l, pp. 275-276, 278, that, "(Leroy) has had ongoing problems with the right knee in
the past (open meniscectomy in 1971 with ongoing swelling and symptoms)."
Dr. Tallerico did not elaborate as to the degree of any "ongoing swelling and symptoms"
within his report. In his deposition, Dr. Tallerico testified that "he believed" he recalled LeRoy
advising him that he had intermittent symptoms of swelling and pain dating back to 1971. Tallerico

Depo., p. 23, LL. 19-23. Of note, Dr. Tallerico also indicated that he was not "surprised" by the fact
that, prior to LeRoy' s initial industrial left knee injury, if LeRoy overused his right knee, any
resultant right knee symptomatology was controlled by and Advil or aspirin. Tallerico Depo., p. 38,
LL. 4-10.
The Commission also noted that Dr. Tallerico recorded that LeRoy "limped." However, that
"limp" was by reason of LeRoy's ambulation, " ...with a slightly antalgic gait favoring the left lower
extremity." (Emphasis added.) JE. G.1., p. 276. With regard to any "swelling" within LeRoy' s right
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 8

knee, such was to be anticipated. As explained by Dr. Tallerico, "[o]ne of the findings of
osteoarthritis is that they develop an effusion." Tallerico Depo., p. 12, L. 25-p. 13, L. 6. No one is
denying that LeRoy had pre-existing right knee degenerative joint disease/osteoarthritis.
2.

Finding of Fact 20, R., p. 179: Here, the Commission noted that during LeRoy's

November 21, 2013, repeat IME examination by Dr. Tallerico, there was apparently no discussion
about LeRoy' s " ...upcoming right knee replacement or its relation to the accident," referencing JE.
G.5. In this regard, it should again be noted that none ofLeRoy's IME presentments to Dr. Tallerico
were with reference to the right knee. Most certainly, LeRoy was aware of the "purpose" of these
presentments, as being with respect to his left knee and not his right. Dr. Tallerico was not a treating
physician for LeRoy. Thusly, there was no need or purpose in LeRoy discussing any medical
condition with which he presented to Dr. Tallerico which was not related to his left knee. LeRoy
would not have discussed his right knee presentment with Dr. Tallerico absent having knowledge
of the "compensable consequences" doctrine. In this regard, LeRoy' s "history" within the context
of Title 72 is that, prior to the February 3, 2009, initial industrial left knee injury at issue herein, he
had had a soft tissue injury to his face; and, had been struck in the nose, with neither of those injuries
being other than med-pay only and with both of those injuries healing without residuals. Hartgrave

Depo., p. 23, L. 21-p. 24, L. 19. JE. 0.1.a., pp. 560-562. As will be discussed subsequently herein,
such also provides logical explanation as to any failure by LeRoy to discuss the "when, how and
whys" of the manifestation of right knee symptomatology with Dr. McKee prior to the right TKA.
3.

Finding of Fact 28, R., p. 182: Here, the Commission emphasized Dr. Tallerico's

testimony that, at the time of Dr. Tallerico's " ...first IME of Claimant, he believed Claimant was a
candidate for a right knee TKA at that time." (Emphasis added). Dr. Tallerico's actual testimony
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is as follows:

Q.

A.

At that point, did you feel that the condition of (Leroy's) right knee was at an
arthroplasty level, based upon your examination, the history, and your review of the
films?
Yes.

Tallerico Depo., p. 12, LL. 7-11. Such was Dr. Tallerico's testimony as Respondents' IME
physician during direct examination by Respondents' counsel herein, Mr. Augustine. However, Dr.
Tallerico could not support that opinion upon cross examination.
Dr. Tallerico conceded that prior to LeRoy's initial industrial left knee injury, there was
nothing in LeRoy' s records or otherwise that Leroy was restricted in going up or down stairs, steps
or ladders; stooping, squatting, crawling, or walking; or, was experiencing any difficulty involving
the right knee whatsoever. Tallerico Depo., p. 38, L. 16-p. 39, L. 13. Responsive to these inquiries,
Dr. Tallerico, himself, emphasized that as Claimant's counsel had " ...pointed out earlier, yourself,
that wasn't the focus of these four exams when I saw him. It was for the left knee." (Emphasis
added). Tallerico Depo., p. 39, LL. 13-15.
Referencing Dr. McKee's finding upon LeRoy's first presentmentto him following the initial
industrial left knee injury of February 3, 2009, that LeRoy then presented with severe right-sided
arthritis, but without pain/symptomatology, Dr. Tallerico testified that had LeRoy presented to him
with right knee presentment, exactly as LeRoy did to Dr. McKee,

Q.

A.
Q.

A.

Under those same circumstance, if this was your patient-same
circumstances-and your patient said, 'my right knee is not the issue; I'm
getting along pretty well with it; I take an aspirin once in a while,' would you
have recommended a right TKA at that point?
At that point in time? No.
Pardon me?
No.
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Tallerico Depo., p. 41, L. 23-p. 42, L. 8. Dr. Tallerico conceded that at the time that LeRoy first

presented to Dr. McKee, the right knee was discussed but that LeRoy advised Dr. McKee that his
symptoms were well-controlled with aspirin, taken "once-in-a-while," and he did not want or need
right knee treatment. Tallerico Depo., p. 38, LL. 4-10; and, p. 39, L. 21-p. 40, L. 11.
Dr. Tallerico conceded that the actual decision to proceed or not with a TKA is pain-driven
on the part of the patient. Tallerico Depo., p. 43, LL. 9-13. The simple fact is that Dr. Tallerico
agreed that no matter the severity of LeRoy' s right knee degenerative joint disease/arthritis upon
diagnostic testing, unless and until LeRoy presents with right knee pain/symptomatology sufficient
for him to make the decision to proceed with TKA, he is not a candidate for TKA. As Dr. Tallerico
phrased it,
Q.

A.

Would you ever recommend a TKA based upon diagnostic film only?
No. We don't treat x-rays. We treat people.

Tallerico Depo., p. 41, L. 1-p. 42, L. 8.

It was following LeRoy' s second left knee surgery that he first complained of right knee
symptomatology sufficient to discuss TKA. Dr. Tallerico agreed that for LeRoy " ...to ultimately
make the decision to proceed with a right TKA, he was experiencing a different level of pain, .... "
Tallerico Depo., p. 38, LL. 11-15.

In Dr. Tallerico's practice, he has had patients " ...who present with horrific osteoarthritic
knees on film and yet have very little manifestation of complaint, of symptomatology''; and sees
" ...something happen where, after that occurrence, those previously, for the most part, asymptomatic
patients develop manifestation." Tallerico Depo., p. 45, L. 18-p. 46, L. 3. It is respectfully
submitted that Dr. Tallerico's experience in his personal practice is perfectly compatible with that
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experienced by LeRoy and his orthopod, Dr. McKee.
As noted by the Commission within Finding of Fact 30, "Dr. Tallerico might change his mind
(causation opinion) if there was documentation that Claimant began complaining of right knee pain
after his second left knee surgery, while he was non-weight bearing." R., pp. 182-183. The kind of
evidence which Dr. Tallerico would be looking for was, " ... either (LeRoy) telling me or him telling
Dr. McKee in the window that we talked about." Thusly, the opinion of Dr. Tallerico, upon which
the Commission denied this claim, rested upon the single fact that the medical records failed to
document LeRoy making complaint of increased right knee symptomatology within the appropriate
''window." This ''window" was the subject of certain of Dr. Tallerico's deposition testimony, as
follows:

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

So to the same extent, surgery on one knee would not affect pre-existing
degenerative joint disease on the opposing knee because of the difference in
gait, the difference in balance, the weight load, the equilibrium or the
opposing knee?
...I would state that it's not impossible to have some effect. Typically, if it
was a large person who had a lot body weight and there was prolonged nonweight-bearing or prolonged abnormalities, it could cause symptoms.
The caveat is the symptoms would occur during the actual recovery,
during the 4-6 weeks after whatever surgery on whatever body part....
So if Mr. Hartgrave would have testified that specifically after the second
industrial left knee injury-and that's the injury of August 23, of2012-and
following the surgery on that left knee by Dr. McKee and, while he was nonweight-bearing, that his symptomatology on the right knee just flared up and
it never went back to baseline, the way it was before and I think he testified
he was non-weight-bearing for six weeks. So within 4 weeks, that's within
that continuum that you testified to?
It is.

Tallerico Depo., p. 46, L. 24-p. 48, L. 12.
LeRoy presented immediately prior to the March 13, 2013, left knee surgery as 68
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inches in height and weighing 228 pounds, which most certainly would come within the category
of a "large person."

JE. C.3., p. 105.

As to the onset/manifestation of his right knee

symptomatology, LeRoy testified:

A.

Q.
A.

After the two surgeries on my left knee, it changed the say I walk and
different things like that. I started having a lot of trouble with this right knee.
Being on crutches for six weeks, totally on the right knee, it just caused all
sorts or problems.
What kind of problems? What were they?
It was in extreme pain. I was having trouble bending it. It just was at the
point where I couldn't get around anymore ... - this right knee never came
back after I got back to work. It still gave me severe problems. (Emphasis
added.)

Hartgrave Depo., p. 62, L. 20-p. 63, L. 11. LeRoy continued,

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

Q.
A.

After your left knee, you were on crutches?
Yes.
...at least as far as you can recall, you were on crutches for six weeks after
your left knee surgery?
Left knee surgery, yes.
Being on the crutches, you were placing most of your weight, if not all of it,
on your right knee?
It was non-weight-bearing on the left leg. Right. ...
By the time you get off your crutches and your right knee surgery in
November, there is a period of time in there. What kind of problems were
you having with your right knee after you got off of the crutches and before
you had the surgery.
It was extremely painful. I was having trouble bending it. It just wouldn't
come back to what it used to be before the six weeks on the crutches. It
wasn't- it just wasn't working.
Give me some examples of what you mean by that.
It would try to lock up on me. It wouldn't -you know, it was painful. I
couldn't bend it. I had trouble, you know, like climbing in and out of the
equipment and some of the trucks. It wouldn't bend.
I had to be extremely careful getting out of things. Either one of my
knees at that point, the left one or the right one, may give me trouble, you
know, when I hit the ground.

Hartgrave Depo., p. 63, L. 21-p. 65, L. 5.
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LeRoy' s testimony as to right knee manifestation of symptomatology which led to the TKA
is uncontradicted, and must be accepted as true, absent it being inherently improbable or rendered
improbable by facts and circumstances disclosed at hearing. Piersto,ff v. Gray's Auto Shop, 58
Idaho 438, 74 P. 2d 171, 175 (Idaho 1931);Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620,603 P.2d 575, 581-82
(Idaho 1979); and, Woodv. Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700,963 P.2d 383,386 (Idaho 1998). Prior to the
second left knee surgery, LeRoy had "no plans of having medical care or treatment involving the
right knee, but following this surgery, LeRoy' s right knee" ...was swollen. I had walked on it for six
weeks with the crutches. So it hadjust taken its toll." Hartgrave Depo., p. 65, LL. 8-17.
Most

certainly,

had

LeRoy

described

the

onset

of

his

right

knee

symptomatology/manifestation to either Dr. Tallerico or Dr. McKee, such that there would have been
"documentation" within the medical records, Dr. Tallerico's causation opinion would have been
favorable to LeRoy, and the Commission would have found the right TKA to be compensable.
Thusly, the logical inquiry should be whether it is fatal to LeRoy's right knee claim that he did not
report the right knee manifestation/onset to Dr. Tallerico and/or Dr. McKee.
First, with respect to Dr. Tallerico, each presentment of LeRoy to Dr. Tallerico was specific
to the left knee and, upon each of those occasions, LeRoy would have known the purpose of the
examination. Tallerico Depo., p. 25, LL, 8-14; and, p. 29, LL. 9-12. Dr. Tallerico's questions to
LeRoy regarding the right knee would not be as thorough as were his questions regarding the left
knee. Tallerico Depo., p. 28, LL. 2-11. Further, Leroy " .. .is tough. He doesn't complaint a lot."

Tallerico Depo., p. 71, LL. 3-5.
At the time of his deposition, Dr. Tallerico had not reviewed LeRoy's deposition transcript
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or his Answers to Interrogatories, regarding LeRoy's description of the onset/manifestation of right
knee symptomatology. Tallerico Depo., p. 28, LL. 12-21. Had Respondents provided Dr. Tallerico
with Leroy's deposition transcript, Dr. Tallerico would have considered the same. However, they
did not. At the time of Dr. Tallerico's deposition, counsel referenced LeRoy's deposition testimony
as to on-set/manifestation of right knee symptomatology, but Dr. Tallerico refused to consider that
testimony or to express opinion upon the premise thereof, while conceding that LeRoy was
forthright, straightforward, and honest. Rather, Dr. Tallerico responded " ...why wasn't it - again,
I don't have that transcript. All I have are my four reports and the medical records, Dr. McKee's
importantly, all ofmy opinions are formulated on that." Tallerico Depo., p. 53, L. 3-p. 54, L. 4.
4.

Finding of Fact 43, R., p. 187: There, the Commission noted Dr. Tallerico's

testimony that the doctor was not aware " ...of any medical literature to support the theory that loss
of normal motion can accelerate degenerative joint disease," citing Tallerico Depo., p. 50.
Irrespective of whether Dr. Tallerico's "awareness" in this regard is accurate or not, it misses the
point. No argument has been made upon behalf of LeRoy that his industrial left knee injuries,
inclusive of the two surgeries by Dr. McKee, resulted in or caused acceleration of his right knee
degenerative joint disease. Rather, the argument advanced upon behalf of LeRoy is that the
manifestation of LeRoy' s right knee symptomatology following the second industrial left knee
surgery was as consequence thereof, and thusly must be considered as compensable. The instant
claim concerns the catalyst and/or inciting cause of the manifestation of unacceptable
symptomatology in LeRoy' s right knee which, concededly, presented with pre-existing degenerative
joint disease which was, mostly, asymptomatic prior to the second left industrial knee surgery.
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5.

FindingsofFact39-43,R., pp. 186-187:

Here, the Commission addressed certain

of Dr. McKee's deposition testimony, and criticized Dr. McKee for changing his opinion from that
expressed within the doctor's July 29, 2014, report to that expressed within his subsequent report
of August 28, 2015. JE. C.3.a. and c., pp. 192 and 200, respectively. The Commission is clearly
wrong in this regard. Rather, by his July 29, 2014, report, Dr. McKee side-stepped the question of
whether LeRoy' s right TKA was accelerated in time by reason of his industrial left knee injuries by
advising that, "Mr. Hartgrave had severe arthritis in his right knee that was noted on his initial visit
in 2009. He would have required a total knee arthroplasty regardless of his industrial injuries." Such
was clearly non-responsive to the inquiry.
Assuming that counsel's July 1, 2014, correspondence to Dr. McKee, which communicated
the inquiry, may have been confusing to the doctor, counsel re-communicated the inquiry by his
August 12, 2015, correspondence. The two correspondences to Dr. McKee are of record as JE.
C.3.a. (1) and c. (1), respectively. The August 12, 2015, correspondence to Dr. McKee attempted to
clearly present the inquiry as
... even accepting that Mr. Hartgrave would have required right TKA regardless of
this industrial left knee injuries, the specific issue is whether you believe it to be
probable that the need for right TKA would have required surgery by November 25,
2013, had the industrial left knee injuries not have occurred.
That correspondence enclosed pages 62-66 ofLeRoy' s deposition testimony relating to onset
of right knee pain. It was responsive to that inquiry that Dr. McKee's August 28, 2015,
report advised that he recalled
...meeting Mr. Hartgrave in 2009 and commenting on his severe right-sided arthritis
and that he told me at that point that he did not have pain and did not want to proceed
with total knee arthroplasty at that time, because of that reason. I do not recall
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addressing his right knee pain at all, until late 2013. At that point his knee was
significantly more painful and he elected to proceed with right total knee arthroplasty.
What I am trying to say is that I feel that his industrial injuries caused an aggravation
to his right knee pain. Had there not been worsening symptoms we would not have
proceed with total knee arthroplasty. Therefore, yes, I believe that his industrial
injuries moved up his need for total knee arthroplasty on the right.
Dr. McKee did not change his medical opinion as between his two reports. Rather, the July
29, 2014, report did not respond to the issue whereas the August 28, 2015, report provided specific
response to the specific inquiry.
LeRoy' s right knee became symptomatic following his second industrial knee surgery, when
he was non-weight-bearing on the left and on crutches for approximately six weeks. With respect
to the effect of being non-weight-bearing on the left, Dr. Tallerico testified, " ...that means that they
are bearing the weight on the right as a result, ...." Tallerico Depo., p. 16, LL. 22-23. As Dr.
Tallerico put it,"[o]bviously, if you are non-weight-bearing on one, you are putting more weight on
the other." Tallerico Depo., p. 58, LL. 16-20.
Dr. Tallerico, himself, has had patients who have "horrible degenerative conditions" who
complain very little of symptoms, "[a]nd then something happens and it disturbs the equilibrium or
the kinematics of the joint, and suddenly they have symptoms.'' Tallerico Depo., p. 56, L. 13-p. 57,
L. 1. Dr. Tallerico concurred that there was nothing within the records which suggested that prior
to the second industrial left knee surgery, LeRoy experienced popping, cracking, crepitus, weakness,
instability, or give-way sensations involving the right knee. Tallerico Depo., p. 37, LL. 6-14.
Significantly, Dr. Tallerico agreed that for LeRoy" ...to ultimately make the decision to proceed with
a right TKA, he was experiencing a different level ofpain, being tough." Tallerico Depo., p. 38, LL.
11-15.
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LeRoy's second industrial left knee injury occurred upon August 23, 2012. LeRoy represented to Dr. McKee upon October 22, 2012, and thereafter upon several occasions prior to the
second industrial left knee surgery of March 13, 2013. Throughout this period, Dr. McKee
documented that LeRoy presented with an altered gait, being a limp on the left. McKee Depo., p.
9, LL. 1-23; JE. C. 3., pp. 87-105. Following the March 13, 2013, industrialleft knee surgery, LeRoy
was non-weight-bearing on the left, with crutches, for a period of approximately six weeks, through
April 23, 2013. McKee Depo., p. 9, L. 25-p. 10, L. 6.
Thereafter, LeRoy re-presented to Dr. McKee upon May 14, June 11, and August 9, 2013.
Upon each of those occasions LeRoy presented with an altered gait, limping on the left. McKee

Depo., p. 10, LL. 7-11; and, JE. C.3., pp. 132-145. Following the August 9, 2013, re-presentment,
Dr. McKee released LeRoy to return to work, with permanent restrictions of no squatting, kneeling
and lifting limited to 50 pounds. JE. C.3., p. 145.
Dr. McKee testified as to the effect of LeRoy's altered gait by reason of a limp on the left,
as follows:

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

With regard to the alteration of gait because of the left knee, would that affect
the weight-bearing load on the right knee?
Yes.
In what regard?
Its just going to put more pressure on that knee when ambulating, even after
being off crutches.
And because of the altered gait, would that affect where that pressure is
located within the knee itself? In other words, does it tilt the plane?
I'm not sure if that's the case. What I would say is that it does-it puts more
pressure because he's leaning on it more.
Would the increased pressure affect the articulating surfaces within the knee
joint?
I think it could aggravate an already damaged joint, yes.

McKee Depo., p. 12, L. 22-p. 13, L. 14.
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Both Drs. Tallerico and McKee agreed that as of the initial industrial left knee injury of
February 3, 2009, LeRoy's right knee was significantly arthritic, being "bone-on-bone." However,
LeRoy advised Dr. McKee that his right knee "didn't hurt," and, for that reason, did not require
treatment. McKee Depo., p. 7, LL. 2-16. Like Dr. Tallerico, Dr. McKee sees patients"...all the time
that have no pain with severe arthritis, but something will set it off, whether its an injury or a fall or
Mr. Hartgrave's situation. He had to depend on that right knee that was already worn." McKee

Depo., p. 14, LL. 1-6. Dr. McKee explained that a TKA requires the marriage of both a bad knee
upon diagnostic studies and symptomatology " ...that from the patient's perspective, he is not willing
to tolerate." McKee Depo., p. 14, LL. 13-18.
Following August 9, 2013, LeRoy next presented to Dr. McKee upon November 8, 2013.
He was then complaining of bilateral knee pain, and advised Dr. McKee " ...that his right knee is
worsening. He reports constant pain. The pain is disabling at times. He can no longer enjoy his
normal activities." Upon that presentment LeRoy and Dr. McKee elected to proceed with right
TKA. JE. C.3., pp. 146-149.
Dr. McKee's records did not "document" any discussion with LeRoy as to the " ...when, how
or why (the right knee) became symptomatic." McKeeDepo., p. 15, LL. 7-16. Dr. McKee testified
that from his perspective, such did not become an issue until following LeRoy's right TKA, and the
doctor's receipt of counsel's July 1, 2014, inquiry. McKee Depo., p. 15, LL. 17-20; JE. C.3.a.(1),
pp. 193-197.
As of the date of Dr. McKee's August 28, 2015, report he had been presented with and had
reviewed LeRoy' s deposition testimony relating to the onset/manifestation of right knee pain which
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led to the decision to proceed with right TKA. JE. C.3.c.(l), pp. 201-202. Having benefit of
LeRoy's testimony, Dr. McKee's August 28, 2015, report advised that following the second
industrial left knee surgery,
... his knee was significantly more painful and he elected to proceed with right total
knee arthroplasty. What I am trying to say is that I feel his industrial injuries caused
an aggravation to his right knee pain. Had there not been worsening symptoms we
would not have proceeded with total knee arthroplasty. Therefore, yes, I believe that
his industrial injuries moved up his need for total knee arthroplasty on the right.

JE. C.3.c., p. 200. Dr. McKee testified that upon accepting LeRoy's testimony, LeRoy's " ...need for
a knee replacement occurred earlier because of aggravation from being on crutches." McKee Depo.,
p. 12, LL. 3-21. Dr. McKee testified that there was no other potential cause for the exacerbation of
LeRoy' s right knee symptomatology having greater probability than the altered gait following the
2013 surgery. McKee Depo., p. 14, L. 23-p. 15, L. 6.
Dr. McKee explained the absence of "documentation" within his records of specific
discussion with LeRoy as to the when, why and how of his increase in right knee symptomatology
which led to the decision to proceed with right TKA. Simply stated, from Dr. McKee's perspective,
it was not an issue until following LeRoy's right TKA, upon the doctor receiving counsel's
correspondence of July 1, 2014. McKee Depo., p. 15, LL. 7-20.

Dr. McKee agreed with Dr.

Tallerico that Leroy was obviously straightforward, honest, hardworking and exhibited no signs of
symptom magnification. Dr. McKee added that LeRoy seemed like a stoic individual. McKee

Depo., p. 15, L. 21-p. 16, L. 11.
From the perspective of LeRoy, Dr. McKee agreed that for someone who is tough and stoic,
it is reasonable to assume that LeRoy thought that after he was off of his crutches and after the gait
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disturbance related to being on crutches went away, his right knee would get better and thusly there
was no need to complain. McKee Depo., p. 31, L. 17-p. 32, L. 15.
III.

Claimant is Entitled to Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 72-804; and/or, I.A.R. 41

Pursuant to J.C.§ 72-804, attorney's fees shall be awarded if the Commission or any court
before whom Title 72 proceedings are brought determines that the employer contested a claim
without reasonable grounds. In the instant matter, it is submitted that the conduct of Defendants
employer and surety, together with their representatives, are subject to the rule of good faith.
Defendants should not be allowed to manipulate the opinions of their IME expert by withholding
relevant, material and pertinent data from the expert.
In the instant matter, as above thoroughly discussed, Dr. Tallerico' s causation opinion would
have been favorable to LeRoy had he found documentation within the records of LeRoy' s
manifestation of right knee symptomatology following his second left industrial knee surgery. It is
understandable that Dr. Tallerico never breached the subject, and the subject was never initiated by
LeRoy, as none of Dr. Tallerico's examinations of LeRoy was specific as to the right knee. Further,
LeRoy's orthopedic surgeon, Dr. McKee, did not believe the "hows and whys and whens" of
LeRoy' s right knee manifestation was an issue, such that he failed to initiate any discussion as to the
same upon LeRoy re-presenting to him with increased right knee symptomatology.
Throughout Dr. Tallerico' s IME reports are his impressions that LeRoy was straightforward;
honest; without indicators of secondary gain; and, a "stand-up" guy. As noted by Dr. Tallerico
within his deposition, if LeRoy would have told the doctor something, the doctor would have
believed him.
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LeRoy' s Workers' Compensation Complaints related to the February 3, 2009 and the August
23, 2012, injuries were filed by instruments dated January 22, 2014. R., pp. 1-4; and, pp. 5-8,
respectively. Each Complaint alleged entitlement to Title 72 benefits by reason of onset of
symptomatology of LeRoy' s right knee related to his change in gait , related to his industrial left
knee presentments, ultimately requiring right TKA. In each of Defendants' Answers to Complaints,
Defendants affirmatively denied liability for LeRoy's right knee injury. R., pp. 10 and 12. LeRoy's
Answers to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories, dated March 31, 2014, asserted, "exacerbation
of pre-existing/underlying non-industrial right knee degenerative joint disease related to and/or by
reason of change in gait and/or altered biomechanics related to Claimant's industrial left knee
injury... ultimately requiring right TKA." JE. 0.1.a., p. 545; and, 2.a., p. 584. LeRoy's deposition
was taken by Defendants upon May 20, 2015, wherein, from page 62, line 9, through page 65, line
17, he discusses the on-set/manifestation of right knee symptomatology following the second
industrial left knee surgery, in detail.
Dr. Tallerico was never requested to and did not examine LeRoy specific to right knee
presentment. Rather, Dr. Tallerico's causation opinion was based upon review of the records
provided him by Defendants. Defendants failed to provide Dr. Tallerico with copies ofLeRoy's
discovery responses or deposition transcript regarding on-set/manifestation of right knee
symptomatology. Further, and even more disturbing, the correspondence to Dr. Tallerico from
Defendants' attorney by which Dr. Tallerico was requested to provide causation opinion represented
that,
[y]our evaluations took place on December 16, 2010, August 6, 2011, November 23,
2013, and April 17, 2014.
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At the times of these examinations, Mr. Hartgrave's right knee was not an
issue in the case. However, since your last evaluation Mr. Hartgrave has claimed that
his total right knee arthroplasty which was performed on November 25, 2013, was
necessitated, in part, by his industrial injuries to his left knee. (Emphasis added).
JE. G.9.a., pp. 332d-e.
Such representation to the doctor was obviously intended by Defendants/Defendants'
counsel, to be relied on by Dr. Tallerico in the formation of his causation opinion. By this
representation, Defendants affirmatively represented that LeRoy' s right knee "was not an issue" prior
to the doctor's examination of LeRoy of April 17, 2014. Such was abjectly false and conveyed the
"message" that LeRoy' s claim related to right knee presentment was fabricated following April 16,
2014, when Defendants had absolute and clear knowledge of that claim effective with the filing of
LeRoy's Complaints, upon January 22, 2014.
This false representation by Defendants to Dr. Tallerico and Defendants' conduct in
withholding LeRoy' s discovery responses and deposition transcript from the doctor's review
constitutes conduct giving rise to sanctions in the form of fees.
CONCLUSION

This Court has held that,
Idaho workers' compensation law is remedial legislation. It is a well-known cannon
of statutory construction that remedial legislation is to be liberally construed to give
effect to the intent of the legislature. (Citations omitted). The intent of the Idaho
legislature in enacting the workers' compensation laws was to provide 'sure and
certain relief for injured workmen... '

Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 109 P.3d 1084, 1088 (Idaho 2005). Title 72 must be
liberally construed in favor of the employee, in order to serve the humane purpose for which the law
was promulgated. Murray-Donahue v. Nat. Car Rental Licensee, 127 Idaho 337, 900 P.2d 1348,
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1351 (Idaho 1995).
The Supreme Court will uphold the Commission's Findings of Fact, if supported by
substantial, competent evidence. The "substantial evidence rule" requires the Court to determine
whether the Commission's findings are reasonable. In deciding whether the findings are reasonable,
the Court should not read only one side of the case and, if any evidence is therein found, sustain the
Commission's action and ignore the records of the contrary. Kirk, supra.; Ewins, supra; and,

Rudolph, supra. Put simply, the substantial evidence rule requires the Court to determine whether
the Findings of Fact are reasonable. Mulder, supra.
In the instant matter, it is respectfully submitted that not only the preponderance, but the
totality of the evidence of record established:
1.

Prior to the March 13, 2013, second industrial left knee surgery, LeRoy's right knee

presented as mostly asymptomatic, requiring only an occasional aspirin should LeRoy "overdo it."

Hartgrave Depo., p. 33, L. 23-p. 34, L. 2.
2.

Following the March 13, 2013, surgery, LeRoy was instructed by Dr. McKee to be

non-weight-bearing on the left, and ambulated with crutches. JE. C.3, pp. 111-125; McKee Depo.,
p. 9, L. 17-p. 10, L. 6.
3.

From and following the March 13, 2013, surgery, LeRoy was noted by Dr. McKee

to ambulate with a limp, on the left, through August 9, 2013, when he was released to return to work
with permanent restrictions. JE. C.3., pp. 143-145; McKee Depo., p. 10, LL. 7-13.
4.

LeRoy' s uncontroverted testimony was that, after the two surgeries on this left knee,

it changed the way he walked and he "started having a lot of trouble with this right knee."
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(Emphasis added.) Hartgrave Depo., p. 62, LL. 20-22. LeRoy explained that being on crutches for
six weeks following the second industrial left knee surgery caused "all sorts of problems." The right
knee was in extreme pain, he was having trouble bending it. His right knee" ...never came back after
(he) got back to work. It still gave me severe problems." Hartgrave Depo., p. 63, LL. 1-11. After
the six weeks on crutches, his right knee would "lock-up"; was painful; and, he couldn't bend it.

Hartgrave Depo., p. 64, L. 13-p. 65, L. 5.
5.

Prior to his second industrial left knee surgery, LeRoy " ...hadn't had any plans of

having anything done with the right knee." Hartgrave Depo., p. 65, LL. 8-12.
6.

When presented with LeRoy's testimony as to right knee manifestation, his

orthopedic surgeon, Dr. McKee, testified within a reasonable degree of medical probability that
LeRoy' s alteration of gait following the second industrial left knee surgery affected the weightbearing load on his right knee, and put more pressure on the right knee, " ...because he's leaning on
it more." Dr. McKee testified that LeRoy required right TKA earlier by reason of his right knee
being aggravated from being on crutches. Dr. McKee testified that there was no other potential
cause for the exacerbation of LeRoy' s right knee symptomatology having greater probability than
the altered gait following the 2013 left knee surgery. McKee Depo., p. 12, L. 3-p. 15, L. 6.
7.

Dr. Tallerico testified that for LeRoy to make the decision to proceed with right TKA,

he was experiencing a "different level" of pain. Tallerico Depo., p. 38, LL. 4-15. Dr. Tallerico
conceded that surgery upon one knee could affect pre-existing degenerative joint disease on the
opposing knee by reason of related gait disturbance, difference in balance, and disruption of the
weight load on the opposing knee. Tallerico Depo., p. 46, L. 24-p. 47, L. 10.
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8.

Dr. Tallerico conceded that LeRoy' s increase in right knee symptomatology following

the March 13, 2013, left knee surgery fell within the anticipated period of time to be related.

Tallerico Depo., p. 48, LL. 2-12.
9.

Both Ors. Tallerico and McKee testified that, in their respective practices, they have

had patients who present with significant degenerative joint disease in the knee yet, who had very
little complaints, when "something happens" and the previously, for the most part, asymptomatic
patients develop manifestation. Tallerico Depo., p. 45, L. 18-p. 46, L. 3. McKee Depo., p. 14, LL.
1-6.
10.

When asked as to any other cause having greater probability for LeRoy' s increase in

rightkneesymptomatologyfollowingtheMarch 13,2013,surgerythanhisalteredgait,Dr. Tallerico
replied that it was "coincidence." Tallerico Depo., p. 54, L. 16-p. 55, L. 8.
Dr. McKee has been Leroy's orthopedic surgeon commencing with the February 3, 2009,
initial left knee industrial injury, through current. Approximately 50% of Dr. McKee's practice is
specific as to knees. McKee Depo., p. 5, LL. 9-20.

In Finding 43, the Commission characterized Dr. Tallerico as one " ...who specializes in
knees." R., p. 187. The Commission failed to note that Dr. Tallerico also "specializes" in being a
hired gun upon behalf of defense. Dr. Tallerico conducts between 120 -150 IMEs per year. Dr.
Tallerico is affiliated with O-M-A-C, an entity which supplies physicians for purposes ofIMEs. The
majority of Dr. Tallerico's IMEs are at the request of defendants. Although Dr. Tallerico indicated
that "probably" 10% of his IMEs are upon behalf of claimants, he could not recall giving testimony
upon behalfof a claimant or claimant's counsel in a contested workers' compensation claim in Idaho
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in the past few years. Tallerico Depo., p. 58, L. 21-p. 60, L. 15.
It is within this context that Dr. Tallerico' s testimony that it was "coincidence," that LeRoy' s
manifestation of right knee symptomatology occurred within the period of time as would be
anticipated if related to the alteration of gait from the second industrial left knee surgery must be
weighed. It is submitted that Dr. Tallerico's "coincidence" opinion constitutes pure speculation
without benefit of medical rationale or logic, and actually is in contrast to other of Dr. Tallerico's
testimony above- referenced.
It is also within the context of Dr. Tallerico's role as Defendants' IME physician that the
doctor's refusal to read or consider LeRoy's deposition testimony as to the manifestation/on-set of
right knee symptomatology following the second industrial left knee surgery should be considered.
Clearly, where Dr. Tallerico, himself, described LeRoy as honest, straightforward, and without
secondary gain issues, such that if LeRoy told him something, the doctor would believe it, had Dr.
Tallerico considered LeRoy's deposition testimony, which had been paraphrased to him by counsel
during cross examination, he would have been without basis to sustain his negative causation
opinion.
This Court has determined that proximate causation can be shown from a "chain of
circumstances from which the ultimate fact required to be established is reasonably and naturally
inferable." Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg. Med. Center, 135 Idaho 775, 25 P.3d 88, 98 (Idaho 2001).
It is not necessary that the cause of the injury relied on be proven to the exclusion of other possible
causes. Suren v. Sunshine Mining Co., 58 Idaho 101, 70 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1937).
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Recall, part of the consideration paid to LeRoy by Defendants for the Modified Lump Sum
Agreement was the sum of $1,927.19, being the amount ofLeRoy's out-of-pocket medical expenses
related to the right TKA procedure. As has oft-times been said, actions speak louder than words. In
this specific matter, the action of the Fund in reimbursing LeRoy his expenses for the right TKA
should speak loudly and clearly upon this issue.
The record in this matter not only supports the logical inference that LeRoy' s need for right
TKA was accelerated/hastened as consequence of the compensable left industrial knee injuries and
related medical procedures, but is totally absent of any other cause having greater probability. There
is, in fact, but one logical cause for the sudden manifestation of unacceptable right knee
symptomatology resulting in need for LeRoy' s right TKA at the point in time required, which is the
aggravation of LeRoy's pre-existing but relatively asymptomatic right knee degenerative joint
disease as consequence of the compensable left knee injuries, specifically encompassing the March
13, 2013, left knee surgery.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

$

day of August, 2017.

STEPHAN, KVANVIG

NE&TRAINOR

BY--.-...=~...~ - ~ - - - , . - - - - - - -

L. Clyel Be
Attorney for Claimant/App

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 28

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State ofldaho and that on the_£_ day
of August, 2017, I served two bound copies of the foregoing document by depositing true copies
thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
Paul J. Augustine
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701
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